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To determine whether relocating domestic pigs, the 
amplifying host of Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV), de-
creased the risk for JEV transmission to humans in northern 
Australia, we collected mosquitoes for virus detection. De-
tection of JEV in mosquitoes after pig relocation indicates 
that pig relocation did not eliminate JEV risk.
Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) is a major cause of viral encephalitis in Southeast Asia; >50,000 cases are 
reported annually (1). Ardeid wading birds are the primary 
maintenance hosts, pigs are the main amplifying hosts, 
and Culex mosquitoes are the primary mosquito vectors. 
Suppression of JEV disease in humans is generally consid-
ered to be best achieved through vaccination of humans or 
swine, mosquito control, or a combination of these strate-
gies (2). An alternative approach of moving domestic pigs 
away from human habitation has been suggested as a poten-
tial method of reducing JEV transmission to humans (1,3). 
Although this strategy could be considered a logical way 
to limit human exposure to infected vectors, the actual ef-
fect that removing domestic pigs would have on mosquito 
infection rates has not been established.
Since the emergence of JEV in northern Australia in 
1995, we (the authors) have investigated the ecology of JEV 
on Badu Island in the Torres Strait, where most human, pig, 
and animal infections have occurred. Intense transmission 
on this island has been linked to domestic pigs, which until 
late 1998 were housed in small backyard pens (Figure 1, 
panel A), and high populations of Culex sitiens subgroup 
mosquitoes (4). In Australia, members of the Cx. sitiens 
subgroup, from which Cx. annulirostris is considered to 
be the most important species, are the primary Australian 
JEV vectors (5). During an outbreak in 1998, the virus was 
shown to be widespread on Badu Island; isolates were ob-
tained from mosquitoes collected throughout the commu-
nity (6). A vaccination program initiated on the outer Tor-
res Strait islands in 1995, including Badu Island, appears to 
have limited the number of human clinical cases (5).
To further reduce JEV risk for Badu Island residents, 
after the 1998 outbreak domestic pigs were removed from 
the Badu Island community to a piggery located ≈2.5 km 
away (Figure 1, panel B). This relocation led to a signifi -
cant reduction in the proportion of Cx. annulirostris feed-
ing on pigs, and speculation was that this might reduce the 
number of JEV-infected mosquitoes (7). We report on the 
effects of pig relocation away from human habitation on 
virus infection rate in Cx. sitiens subgroup mosquitoes.
The Study
In response to JEV activity, as evidenced by human 
clinical cases or the seroconversion of sentinel pigs, adult 
mosquitoes were collected on Badu Island during 1995, 
1998, and 2003 (6,8, and this article, respectively). Badu 
Island is located at 10º07′S and 142º09′E in the central 
western region of the Torres Strait and is a granite island of 
≈101 km2; its ecology has been described (6–8).
The mosquitoes were collected with Centers for Dis-
ease Control (CDC) miniature light traps (Model 512; John 
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Figure 1. Pig housing in Badu Island. A) Typical backyard pig pen 
in community before removal in 1998 and B) Badu Island piggery, 
where pigs have been housed since late 1998.
Pigs and Japanese Encephalitis, Australia 
W. Hock Co., Gainesville, FL, USA) baited with either CO2 
alone or in combination with 1-octen-3-ol. Mosquitoes were 
killed on dry ice and placed in liquid nitrogen dry shippers 
or on dry ice in insulated containers for transport to Cairns 
for storage at –70oC. Mosquitoes were placed on a refrig-
erated table for species or taxonomic group identifi cation 
before being placed in pools of <200 mosquitoes and sent to 
Queensland Health Forensic and Scientifi c Services or the 
University of Queensland, Brisbane, for JEV detection.
The virus isolation protocols used in 1995 and 1998 
have been described (6,8). In 2003, virus RNA was detected 
by using a real-time TaqMan reverse transcription–PCR (9).
To facilitate the comparison of virus distribution on 
Badu Island, trap locations were grouped into 3 general ar-
eas: within 1.2 km of the piggery, within the area of human 
habitation (the community), and at a rubbish dump located 
≈1.5 km from the community and 4.0 km from the piggery 
(Figure 2). Dumps are a potential focus of JEV activity be-
cause mosquitoes, feral pigs, and wading birds congregate 
at them (10). Maximum-likelihood estimation of mosquito 
infection rates with 95% confi dence intervals were calcu-
lated for each of these general areas by using the PooledIn-
fRate statistical software package (11).
Because of the diffi culty in morphologically separat-
ing the members of the Cx. sitiens subgroup, data for the 
3 members of the group found in Australia—Cx. annuliro-
stris, Cx. palpalis, and Cx. sitiens—were pooled for analy-
sis. However, PCR restriction fragment length polymor-
phism analysis of a subsample of 135 Cx. sitiens subgroup 
mosquitoes collected in 2003 showed that Cx. annulirostris 
was the dominant member of this group on Badu Island and 
comprised 94.1% of polymorphic specimens processed; the 
other 4.4% and 1.5% were identifi ed as Cx. palpalis and 
Cx. sitiens, respectively.
A total of 44,328 Cx. sitiens subgroup mosquitoes 
were processed for detection of JEV; 2,871, 24,592, and 
16,865 were processed from 1995, 1998, and 2003, respec-
tively (Table). JEV was detected in 66 pools of Cx. sitiens 
subgroup mosquitoes; the highest maximum-likelihood es-
timation of mosquito infection rate was obtained from mos-
quitoes collected at the dump in 1998. Despite removal of 
the domestic pigs, JEV was still detected in 5 pools of Cx. 
sitiens subgroup mosquitoes collected within the commu-
nity in 2003. However, the point estimates of infection rates 
were lower than those obtained in 1995 and 1998, when do-
mestic pigs were present within the community, although 
the slight overlap in 95% confi dence intervals indicates that 
this difference in infection rate was not signifi cant.
Conclusions
We demonstrated that although removing domestic 
pigs from areas of human habitation may reduce contact 
between amplifying hosts and vectors (7), it does not elimi-
nate the presence of JEV-infected mosquitoes. Thus, pig 
removal does not negate JEV risk for humans. Indeed, evi-
dence for low-level virus transmission to humans is provid-
ed by Hanna et al., who found a low level (32%) of natural 
boosting immunity in Badu residents who had received an 
inactivated mouse brain–derived JEV vaccine 3 years ear-
lier (12).
As has been observed elsewhere in the absence of pigs 
(13), mosquitoes may have become infected by feeding on 
viremic herons and egrets, populations of which are found 
on Badu Island (14). Analysis of host feeding patterns 
demonstrated that birds accounted for 23% of blood meals 
of Cx. annulirostris identifi ed from the dump in 2003 (S. 
Hall-Mendelin and A.F. van den Hurk, unpub. data). Alter-
nately, feral pigs in the community and at the dump are a 
potential source of virus for mosquitoes, although <1% of 
mosquito blood meals were from swine at these locations.
Mosquitoes could become infected by feeding on vire-
mic pigs at the piggery and then disperse to other areas on 
the island. The mean fl ight distance of Cx. annulirostris is 
4.4 km; some females traverse up to 12 km (15), which is 
considerably farther than the 2.5 km between the piggery 
and the community on Badu Island. Solomon recommends 
that domestic pigs be moved >5 km from human habitation 
to limit JEV transmission to humans (3). Indeed, if infected 
mosquitoes were fl ying from the piggery to the community, 
then the data from our study support this recommendation. 
However, we suggest that domestic pigs be removed far 
enough away from human habitation to encompass the 
fl ight range of the local Culex vectors.
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Figure 2. Aerial photograph of Badu Island showing the location of 
the community, piggery, and rubbish dump.
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Table. Mosquito infection rates during 3 recognized incursions of Japanese encephalitis virus, Badu Island, northern Australia*
Pigs located within community Pigs relocated outside community 
1995 1998 2003
Collection
location No.†
No.
detected‡
Infection rate 
(95% CI) No.†
No.
detected‡
Infection rate 
(95% CI) No.†
No.
detected‡
Infection rate 
(95% CI) 
Community 2,871 8 3.02  
(1.43–5.74) 
23,467 38 1.69  
(1.21–2.29) 
7,019 5 0.75  
(0.28–1.66) 
Piggery NS NS NS NS NS NS 3,316 5 1.61  
(0.61–3.56) 
Dump NS NS NS 1,125 4 3.68  
(1.20–8.85) 
6,530 6 0.99  
(0.41–2.07) 
*Mosquito infection rates determined by maximum-likelihood estimation; 1995, Apr 8–9 and 20–21, 30 trap nights; 1998, Mar 5–6, 25 trap nights; 2003, 
Mar 13–19, 92 trap nights; CI, confidence interval; NS, mosquitoes not sampled from this location during the year of collection.
†Total no. mosquitoes processed. 
‡No. Japanese encephalitis virus–positive pools detected by virus isolation or TaqMan reverse transcription–PCR. 
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